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Theoretically, polarization is associated with a higher probability of social con-
flict. This paper, in a microeconomic model based on the theory of social net-
works, analyses how changes in the network’s structure affect the level of some 
basic parameters associated with the concept of polarization. This study shows 
that under upward monotonic preferences, longer sets of affiliations for each indi-
vidual reduce polarization, whereas under downward monotonic preferences, lon-
ger sets of the so-called bad affiliations increase polarization. Finally, in the case 
of a non-monotonic system of preferences, an expansion of the affiliations set will 
alter the resulting polarization order in different ways depending on the preferen-
ces themselves. 
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Cárdenas, E. (2013). Polarización social y conflicto: un enfoque de redes. Cua-
dernos de Economía, 32(61), 787-801.
En la teoría, la polarización se asocia con una mayor probabilidad de conflicto 
social. Este artículo analiza, dentro de un modelo microeconómico basado en la 
teoría de redes sociales, cómo los cambios en la estructura de la red afectan el nivel 
de algunos parámetros básicos asociados con el concepto de polarización. Tam-
bién muestra que bajo preferencias monótonas crecientes, la existencia de conjun-
tos más largos de afiliaciones para cada individuo reduce la polarización, mientras 
que, bajo preferencias monótonas decrecientes, los conjuntos más largos de las lla-
madas malas afiliaciones aumentan la polarización. Por último, en el caso de un 
sistema no monótono de preferencias, una expansión del conjunto de afiliaciones 
alterará el orden resultante de polarización de diferentes maneras, dependiendo de 
las preferencias mismas. 
Palabras clave: polarización, conflicto, preferencias, teoría de redes.
JEL: D71, D74. 
Cárdenas, E. (2013). Polarisation sociale et conflit : une approche de réseaux. 
Cuadernos de Economía, 32(61), 787-801.
En théorie, la polarisation est associée à une plus grande probabilité de conflit 
social. Cet article analyse, dans un modèle microéconomique basé sur la théo-
rie des réseaux sociaux, la manière dont les changements dans la structure du 
réseau affectent le niveau de certains paramètres de base associés au concept 
de polarisation. Cette étude montre que, avec des préférences monotones crois-
santes, l’existence d’ensembles plus longs d’affiliations pour chaque individu 
réduit la polarisation tandis que, avec des préférences monotones décroissantes, 
les ensembles plus longs de ce qu’on appelle des mauvaises affiliations augmen-
tent la polarisation. Enfin, dans le cas d’un système non monotone de préférences, 
une expansion de l’ensemble d’affiliations altèrera l’ordre résultant de polarisation 
de différentes manières, selon les préférences elles-mêmes.
Mots-clés : polarisation, conflit, préférences, théorie de réseaux.
JEL : D71, D74. 
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INTRODUCTION
The opening words of Amartya Sen’s famous book on economic inequality are 
“The relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one, and it runs 
both ways” (Sen & Foster, 1997). However, recent literature in economics has rai-
sed questions about the accuracy of the very concept of inequality and its correla-
tion with social conflict (Esteban & Ray, 1994, 1999). As a result, it seems that the 
concept of polarization is better suited than that of inequality for explaining the 
probability of social conflict.
Not surprisingly, in his recent work on Identity and Violence, Sen himself rests on 
the notions underlying the concept of polarization, those of within-group homoge-
neity and between-group heterogeneity:
“A sense of identity can be a source not merely of pride and joy but also of strength 
and confidence... And yet identity can also kill—and kill with abandon. A strong—
and exclusive—sense of belonging to one group can in many cases carry with it 
the perception of distance and divergence from other groups. Within-group solida-
rity can help to feed between-group discord” (Sen, 2006, pp. 1-2).
Reductionist ideologies based on defining individuals or societies in terms of a 
unique affiliation can be used to foster strong feelings of within-group solidarity, 
but also ones of between-group disagreement. Thus, it becomes easier to promote 
conflict as a social outcome. The problem with these theories is that they reduce a 
multidimensional issue to an unidimensional one.
As an example, consider Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations (Hun-
tington, 1996) in which religion is the only affiliation considered when talking 
about civilizations and conflict. Following Sen’s analysis of this theory, the clas-
sification of people in terms of belonging either to Western civilization or Isla-
mic civilization is based on two misconceptions. First, the very idea of classifying 
people into either one of the two civilizations is an extreme reductionist view that 
misses the complexity of the essence of human beings; and second, to assume that 
individuals in each of these civilizations must have a sense of antagonism towards 
those who belong to the other group ignores the multiple affiliations of indivi-
duals. In fact, every individual belongs to different social groups and, therefore, 
has multiple affiliations, each of which confers a specific identity to that indivi-
dual: profession, employment, family role, preferences for music, sports or poli-
tics are just a few examples.
Similar examples of reductionism, with social conflict as an outcome, can be found 
all over the world. In Rwanda, perception of individuals only in terms of ethni-
city as either Hutu or Tutsi kept the country in continuous civil war and produced 
atrocities such as the 1995 genocide, which caused almost one million causali-
ties in just a few days. According to Sen, Bangladesh obtained its independence 
from Pakistan in 1971 after a bloody civil war due to the reduction of individuals’ 
affiliations to just one, that of language. In Colombia, where peace has become 
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extremely difficult to achieve, both sides in the conflict have a reductionist view. 
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) perceive society as 
being the status quo they want to change, whereas most of that same society only 
perceive the FARC as mere terrorists. In Syria, since the outset of the war in 2011, 
things have been difficult for the rebeals because of the lack of weapons, com-
batants and a unified ideology among the different small rebel groups. However, 
the reductionist view of the conflict—for or against Assad—has intensified the 
conflict enormously. Following conservative numbers, there are more than 65.000 
thousand deaths due to the armed conflict.
Recognition of the fact that individuals have multiple affiliations expands the 
spectrum of commonalities among people and abates their sense of antagonism.
Societies where the multiple affiliations of individuals are taken into account 
generate more peaceful environments as social outcomes. Switzerland, for exam-
ple, where Germans, French and Italians are the three main groups forming the 
society and where each of their languages is classed as one of the country’s official 
languages is a good example of a peaceful environment with individuals having 
different affiliations.
In economics, most of the work relating to polarization and conflict has been 
undertaken considering unidimensional categories for defining groups within 
society. Examples of polarization analysis, in terms of only one relevant charac-
teristic, are those by Gasparini, Horenstein, Molina and Oliveri (2008), based on 
income; Montalvoa and Reynal-Querol (2003) and Reynal-Querol (2002b), based 
on religion; or Reynal-Querol (2002a), based on ethnicity.
The main contribution of this work is to use social networks theory as a way to 
deal with the fact that individuals have multiple affiliations. Specifically, with a 
microeconomic model based on the theory of social networks, this study analy-
zes how changes in the structure of a given network, representing a given society, 
affect the level of some basic parameters of the network which, in turn, are asso-
ciated with the concept of polarization and, as a consequence, its relation with 
social conflict.
Here, it is assumed that each individual has not just one, but several affiliations. 
Affiliations of individuals and their relationships are captured by means of a hyper-
graph. Each individual is endowed with a preference system over the set of all pos-
sible affiliations (i.e. the power set of the set of affiliations) so that she can choose 
among all of them. Both, the hypergraph and the preference system induce a com-
munication graph.
Two specific preference systems are analyzed: a monotonic and a non-monotonic 
system. Under the monotonic system, two individuals decide to communicate with 
each other if they mutually consider the other’s set of affiliations as being at least 
as good as its threshold affiliations system set i.e. the set of minimum affiliations 
she considers crucial for communicating with someone else.
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The non-monotonic system is obtained by positing thresholds of good combi-
nations of affiliations and ceilings of bad combinations of affiliations. In other 
words, each individual has an exhaustive partition over the set of all possible affi-
liations. Here, two individuals communicate if the affiliations of each individual 
are considered as good as their own good affiliations and none of them are consi-
dered bad affiliations.
If communication among individuals occurs, then, they will be linked in the asso-
ciated communication graph.
The paper proceeds as follows. Some basic concepts derived from the theory of 
networks are introduced in section 2. Section 3 outlines the concept of polariza-
tion and formally defines two (pre)orders for ranking networks in terms of pola-
rization. A model of social communication based on characteristics of the social 
structure, represented here by means of an hypergraph, and a system of social pre-
ferences is developed in section 4. Section 5 presents some comparative statics 
excercises; in particular, the analysis of how changes in the affiliation sets for each 
individual and changes in social preferences, may alter the degree of social pola-
rization through changes in the associated communication network. Finally, the 
conclusions of the work are presented.
PRELIMINARY NETWORK CONCEPTS
This section presents a definition of the concepts of the theory of networks and 
groups that will be used throughout to be related with the notion of polarization and 
for building up the microeconomic model in order to perform comparative statics2.
Definition 1 (Hypergraph) A hypergraph H V E= ,( )  consists of a set of ver-
tices or nodes V  = v v
n1,...,{ }  and a set of hyperedges E e em= ,...,1{ }  which is 
nothing more than a collection of subsets of V .  Each hyperedge, therefore, con-
tains one or more vertices and we say that those vertices are linked by that par-
ticular hyperedge. 
Definition 2 (Network) A network  = ( , )N G  consists of a set of nodes 
N n= 1,...,{ }  and a set of links G. = , ,..., .1 2g g gm{ }
 
Each link gi  is identified by 
the pair of respective nodes which are connected by gi.  Each link in G  represents 
a relationship between nodes i  and j . 
Definition 3 (Degree of a Node) The degree of a node is the number of links in   
incident with the node i.
Definition 4 (Path) A path in a network   between nodes i  and j  is a sequence 
of links g gK1,...,  such that g gk k+ ∈1 Γ  for each k K∈ −{ }1,..., 1 , with g i1 =  and 
g jK = .
2 The book by Jackson (2008) is a good book for the reader interested into the theory of social 
networks.
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Definition 5 (Component) A (connected) component of a network  = ( , )N G , is 
a nonempty subnetwork C’ = ( , )N G’ ’ , such that ∅≠ ⊂ ⊂N N G G’ ’, ,
  if i N G’ ( )  and j N G’ ( )  where j i , then there exists a path in G’  bet-
ween i  and j , and
  if i N G’ ( )  and j N G’ ( )  then there does not exists a path in G  between i  
and j.
Thus, the components of a network are the distinct maximal connected subgra-
phs of a network. The set of components of   is denoted C( ) . Note that 
Γ
Γ
=
( )C’ C
’C
∈

. 
Definition 6 (Clique) A clique is a maximal completely connected subnetwork Q  
of a given network  .
It is noteworthy to note that a clique is a maximal completely connected sub-
network while a component is a maximal path-connected subnetwork. Neither 
implies the other.
Definition 7 (Relative Size) Given a network   with more than one component, 
the relative size of a component Γ Γ’ C∈ ( )  is given by
 
S
N G
N’
’
Γ
=
# ( )
#
{ }
{ }
 
Definition 8 (Overall Clustering Coeficient) It is a measure of the average pro-
bability that two nodes k j,  directly connected to node i  are also connected 
among themselves 
Cl
jk k j j N k N
jk k j j N k N
i i i
i i i
Γ
Γ Γ Γ
Γ Γ
( )
∈ ≠ ∈ ( ) ∈ ( ){ }
≠ ∈ ( ) ∈
∑
∑
=
# , ,
# , ,
|
| ( ){ }
Definition 9 (Star) A hypergraph H = ,V E( )  is called a star if there is a node 
which belongs to all hyperedges. 
Definition 10 (Representative Graph of a Hypergraph) Let H  = (V; e1, e2,…, en) 
be a hypergraph with n  edges. The representative graph of H  is defined to be 
the simple graph of order n  whose nodes 1, 2,…, n respectively represent the 
edges e1, e2,…, en of H and with nodes 1 and j joined by an edge if, and only if, 
e ei j∩ ≠∅.
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POLARIZATION AND THE THEORY OF 
NETWORKS
This section presents the definition of polarization and that of two (pre)orders for 
ranking different networks in terms of polarization. The first is a (pre)order based 
on the relative size of the main components of a network and, the second, is based 
on the clustering coefficient. The two (pre)orders will be referred to as component-
size polarization and clustering polarization respectively.
Polarization
In general, and following (Esteban and Ray, 1994), three basic elements must be 
present when talking about social polarization and to consider it as a threat for 
social order:
1) There must be a small number of significantly sized groups,
2) An individual belonging to any of the groups must feel a sense of identifica-
tion or within-group homogeneity with the rest of individuals belonging to 
the same group and,
3) Individuals belonging to the same group must feel some degree of distance 
or between-group heterogeneity from individuals belonging to other groups. 
Component-Size Polarization
The idea of component-size polarization captures the need for small, but signifi-
cantly sized different groups within society as a pre-requirement for polarization. 
Thus, we base this component-size polarization preorder in the network-theoretic 
notion of components (definition 5 in the previous section).
The following axioms define the component-size polarization:
Axiom 1 Consider any two networks Γ1 1 1= ,N G{ }  and Γ2 2 2= ,N G{ }  with the 
same population i.e. N N1 2=  and let C C Ci i
mi
i
= ,...,1{ }  with i = 1,2  be the set of 
ordered components, in terms of size, from higher to lower, of network i . Then, 
other things being equal, 1 p 2  whenever # #1 2C Cj j , for j = 1,2.  i.e. the 
cardinality for one of the two largest components in 1  is greater or equal than 
that in 2 .
Axiom 1 captures the idea of significantly sized groups through the concept of net-
work components and their relative size. Each component represents a different 
social group. The fact that, by definition, there are no links at all between compo-
nents represents the idea of maximum distance between the groups or between-group 
heterogeneity. This axiom focuses on the cardinality or relative size of the first two 
largest components taking account of the first pre-requirement in the previous defi-
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nition of polarization (There must be a small number of significantly sized groups.) 
In fact, the axiom establishes that the greater the size of at least one of the two largest 
components, other things being equal, the larger the degree of polarization.
Axiom 2 Maximum amount of polarization. Let Γ = ,N G{ }  be such that 
Q N G1 1 1= ,( )  and Q N G2 2 2= ,( )  are the only two cliques of   with relative 
size equal to a half i.e. S SQ Q1 2= =
1
2
,  and N N1 2 = ;∩ ∅  then,  
P ’
 for any 
’ ’N G= ( , ).
Axiom 2 captures the idea of a society divided only into two groups of equal size 
(each of them equal to a half) with the largest distance among them and with 
all individuals in each group having communication among them (represented by 
means of completely connected components or cliques). Such a society exhibits 
the maximum amount of polarization.
Axiom 3 One component networks exhibit minimal polarization. 
Axiom 3 focuses on cases where society can be seen as having only one social 
group in the sense that everyone communicates with each other directly, they share 
some affiliations, or indirectly, they communicate through someone else.
Clustering Polarization
The idea of clustering polarization is based on the idea of identification or within-
group homogeneity, the second pre-requirement in the previous definition of polari-
zation. Other things being equal, the greater the feelings of identification among the 
members of the group, the greater the level of polarization. Thus, I base this clus-
tering polarization preorder in the network-theoretic notion of overall clustering or 
clustering coefficient of the components (definiton 8 in the previous section).
As before, it is noteworthy that the fact that, by definition, there are no links at all 
between components represents the idea of maximum distance between the groups 
or between-group heterogeneity, the third pre-requirement in the previous defini-
tion of polarization.
The following axioms define clustering polarization:
Axiom 4 Consider any two networks Γ1 1 1= ,N G{ }  and Γ2 2 2= ,N G{ }  with the 
same population i.e. N N1 2=  and let C C Ci i
m
i
= ,...,1{ }  with i = 1,2  be the set of 
ordered components of network i,  ordered in terms of size from higher to lower. 
Then,  1 2P  if Cl C Cl C11 12>( ) ( )  and Cl C Cl C21 22> .( ) ( )
Axiom 4 captures the idea of within-group homogeneity through the concept of 
overall clustering. The intuition behind overall clustering is the following: first, 
we considered the total number of pairs of nodes j k,  that presented a link with a 
common third node i . Then, we looked at how many of those pairs j k,  are actua-
lly connected to wach other. If we repeat the exercise for all of i
,
 then we have 
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the overall clustering of the network. Thus, the axiom focuses on within-group 
homogeneity by measuring how tightly clustered individuals are within each of the 
two largest components. Therefore, other things being equal, the higher the ove-
rall clustering coefficient of the components the higher the degree of polarization.
Axiom 5 For networks with only one component then  ’ P  if and only if 
 C ’  i.e.   has greater clustering coefficient. 
Axiom 5 is a refinement for networks with only one component. The network with 
the greater clustering coefficient or within group homogeneity is considered less 
polarized, people communicate more with each other.
THE MODEL
Let H = (V, E) be a social affiliation hypergraph where V = {v1,…, vn} denotes the 
finite set of individuals in society and the set E = {e1,…, vm} denotes the set of all 
possible affiliations in that society.
For each i V , E e E i ei k k( ) ∈ ∈= { : }  is the set of all non trivial affiliations, 
Ek (i.e. affiliations with cardinality greater than 2, # 2e  ) such that individual i  
belongs to them.
Each individual is assumed to have a binary dichotomic system of preferences. 
A binary system of preferences i
E P E P E⊆ ( )× ( )  is dichotomic if and only 
if there is a partition G Bi
E
i
E
,( )  of P(E) (the power set of E) such that for any 
A B P E, ,∈ ( ) A Bi
E  if and only if A Gi
E  or B Bi
E ,  or both. Here, Gi  
represents the set of affiliations considered by individual i  as “good” affiliations 
and Bi  represents the set of affiliations considered by individual i  as “bad” affilia-
tions. First, it is assumed that preferences can be either “upward” or “downward” 
monotonic.
Preferences are “upward” monotonic if and only if they are dichotomic and there 
exist T T Ti i i
k
= ,
1
...,{ }  such that T P Eih ⊆ ( )  and A GiE  if and only if A Tih
’  
for some h’, h k’ = 1,..., .
Preferences are “ downward”  monotonic if and only if dichotomic and there exist 
T T Ti
’
i
’
i
’k
= ,
1
...,{ }  such that T P Ei’h ⊆ ( )  and A BiE  if and only if A Ti’h
’  for 
some h’, h k’ = 1,..., .
This monotonic structure of preferences implies that supersets of T Ti
k
i  belong 
to the set Gi ,  i.e. to the set of affiliations considered by i  as “good.” This property 
can miss a real and important issue. Consider, for instance, that one affiliation in 
the affiliation set X  is that of belonging to a mafia. Under the monotonic assump-
tion, as far as T Xi
k   then X Gi , meaning that i  establishes a tie with j  
without any consideration about the fact that j  is part of the mafia! Of course, this 
is unrealistic. In order to cope with this real and important issue, we also modeled 
preferences in an alternative “mixed” non-monotonic way.
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Preferences are “mixed” non-monotonic if and only if dichotomic and there exist 
T T Ti i i
k
= ,
1
...,{ }  and T T Ti’ i’ i’k= ,1 ...,{ }  such that A GiE  if and only if there exists 
Ti
l
 and Ti
’m
 such that A Ti
l  and A Ti
’m  for all m k= 1,..., .
Finally, we assume that any social system H i
E
i V
, ( )( )
∈
 induces a communication 
network (graph) Γ H( ).  Specifically, given a social system H iE i V, ( )( )∈  then, for 
all i j V, ; ij H∈ ( )Γ  if and only if E G E Gi jE j iE( ) ( )∈ ∈ and .
If there is no link among individuals i  and j  then, it is assumed that individuals 
either do not know each other or they are not able to cope with their different affi-
liations sets in order to establish communication. In any of both cases and to sim-
plify matters, the result is the same; they feel separate from one another.
COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section, we analyze how changes in the affiliation sets for each individual 
and changes in social preferences may alter the degree of social polarization. Spe-
cifically, we focus on how expansions of the affiliations sets of each individual 
affect polarization under the three different types of preferences proposed in the 
model i.e. upward and downward monotonic, and mixed non-monotonic preferen-
ces. Additionally, we also analyze how such an expansions alter polarization for 
centralized societies, characterized here by hypergraphs called “stars.” 
Proposition 1 Let H V E= ,( )  be a social affiliation hypergraph with “upward 
monotonic” dichotomic preference profile  i i V i E i V( ) ( )∈ ( ) ∈=  and with systems 
of thresholds given by T T Ti i ik= ,...,1{ }  for each i V . Then, for any i j V, ,
i j H,( )∈ ( )−Γ also written ij ∈ ( )−Γ H  if and only if there exist Til  and Tim  
such that E Ti j
m
( ) ⊇  and E Tj i
l
( ) ⊇ .
Proof. Suppose ij ∈ ( )Γ H  then by definition E Gi jE( ) ∈  and E Gj iE( ) ∈  i.e. there 
exist Ti
l
 and Tj
m
 such that E T x Ej i
l
i
l
i( ) ( )⊇ { }⊆=  and E T x Ei jm jm j( ) ( )⊇ { }⊆= . 
Hence, E Ei j( ) ( )∩ ≠.
Proposition 1 shows that with upward monotonic dichotomic preferences, two 
individuals communicate if and only if they share at least one affiliation of those 
who individually they consider as good or desirable affiliations in order for them 
to establish communication.
Proposition 2 Under “upward monotonic” dichotomic preferences 
 i i V i E i V
( ) ( )
∈ ( ) ∈
= , with systems of thresholds given by T T Ti i ik= ,...,1{ }  for each 
i V . If H V E= , ,( ) H V E’ ’= ,( )  such that E Ei i’( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  then 
Γ ΓH H’( )⊆ ( ).
Proof. If ij H∈ ( )Γ  then, there exist T Tik jh,  such that E T E Ti jh j ik( ) ( )⊇ ⊇, .  
Hence E Ti
’
j
h
( ) ⊇  and E E Tj
’
j i
k
( ) ( )⊇ ⊇  and thus ij H’∈ ( )Γ .
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Proposition 2 shows that if there is an expansion of each individual affiliations set, 
then, under upward monotonic dichotomic preferences, the new associated com-
munication graph—after expansion—must include the initial one. The intuition is 
that if all individuals expand their affiliation sets then there would be more, or at 
least the same, communication links among individuals in society.
Proposition 3 Under “upward monotonic” dichotomic preference profile 
 i i V i V i V
( ) ( )
∈ ( ) ∈
= , with systems of thresholds given by T T Ti i ik= ,...,1{ }  for 
each i V . If H V E= , ,( ) H V E’ ’= ,( )  such that E Ei i’( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  
then Γ ΓH H’ P( ) ( ) .
Proof. If E Ei i
’
( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  then, Γ ΓH H
’( )⊆ ( )  (Proposition 2). 
Hence, there exists at least one ij H’∈ ( )Γ  such that ij H∉ ( )Γ .  Therefore, 
Cl H Cl H’ (   (Γ Γ( )) ( ))≥ .  Hence, Γ ΓH H’ P( ) ( ) ,  according to the component-
size polarization (Axiom 1). The cardinality of one of the greatest components in 
H’  will be less than that in H.
Proposition 3 shows that under upward monotonic dichotomic preferences, one 
graph is less polarized than the other if the affiliation sets of the former (one for 
each individual) includes the affiliation sets of the latter. The intuition grounds on 
the previous result, if all individuals expand their affiliation sets, then, there would 
be more, or at least the same, communication links among individuals in the new 
society. Therefore, other things being equal, there would be more communication 
among individuals who did not communicate before and as a consequence, the 
graph will be less polarized.
Proposition 4 Under “downward monotonic” dichotomic preferences 
 i i V i E i V
( ) ( )
∈ ( ) ∈
= , with systems of thresholds given by T T Ti i’ i’k= ,...,1{ }  for 
each i V . If H V E= , ,( ) H V E’ ’= ,( )  such that E Ei i’( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  
then Γ ΓH H’( )⊇ ( )  i.e. if each player’s set of affiliations is extended, then the 
resulting communication graph shrinks.
Proof. If ij H∉ ( )Γ  then, there exist T Ti’k j’h,  such that E Ti j’h( ) ⊇  and E Tj i’k( ) ⊇ .  
Hence, E Ti
’
j
’h
( ) ⊇  and E Tj
’
i
’k
( ) ⊇  and thus ij H’∉ ( )Γ .
Proposition 4 shows that, under downward monotonic dichotomic preferences, if 
there is an expansion of each individual’s affiliations set then, the new associa-
ted communication graph—after expansion—must be included in the initial one. 
The intuition behind the proof is that if all individuals expand their affiliation sets, 
then, there would be less, or at least the same, communication links among indi-
viduals in society.
Proposition 5 Under “downward monotonic” dichotomic preferences 
 i i V i E i V
( ) ( )
∈ ( ) ∈
= , with systems of thresholds given by T T Ti i’ i’k= ,...,1{ }  for 
each i V . If H V E= , ,( ) H V E’ ’= ,( )  such that E Ei i’( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  
then Γ ΓH H’ P( ) ( ) .
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Proof. If E Ei i
’
( ) ( )⊆  for each i V  then, Γ ΓH H
’( )⊇ ( )  (Proposition 4). 
Hence there may exist at least one ij H∈ ( )Γ  such that ij H’∉ ( )Γ .  Therefore, 
Cl H Cl H’ (   (Γ Γ( )) ( ))≤ .
 Hence, Γ ΓH H’ P( ) ( ) , according to the component 
size polarization (Axiom 1). The cardinality of one of the greatest components in 
H’  will be greater than that in H.
Proposition 5 shows that under downward monotonic dichotomic preferences, one 
graph is more polarized than the other, if the affiliation sets of the former (one for 
each individual) include the affiliation sets of the latter. The intuition grounds on 
the previous proposition, if all individuals expand their affiliation sets, then, there 
would be less, or at least the same, communication links among individuals in the 
new society. Therefore, other things being equal, there would be less communi-
cation among individuals than before and, as a consequence, the graph would be 
more polarized.
Proposition 6 Under “mixed non-monotonic” preferences  i i V i E i V( ) ( )∈ ( ) ∈=  
with system of thresholds and ceilings T T Ti i ik= ,1 ...,{ }  and T T Ti’ i’ i’k= ,1 ...,{ } , if 
H V E= , ,( ) H V E’ ’= ,( )  such that E Ei
’
i( ) ( )⊇  for each i V  then, the resul-
ting communication graph Γ H’( )  may grow larger, shrink, or stay the same with 
respect to Γ H( ).
Proof. Let ϒ i i
’
i
’
iE E E= .\ ∩  If E Ei
’
i( ) ( )⊇  such that ϒ i i
’T∩ =  then E Ti
’
i
l
( ) ⊇  
and E Ti
’
i
’m
( )   for all m k= 1,..., . Hence, Γ H
’( )
 will grow larger than Γ H( ) . If 
E Ei
’
i( ) ( )⊇  such that ϒ i i
’T∩ ≠  then E Ti
’
i
l
( ) ⊇  and E Ti
’
i
’m
( )   for at least one 
m k= 1,..., .
 
Hence, Γ H’( )  will shrink with respect to Γ H( ).
Proposition 6 shows that under non-monotonic preferences systems, an expan-
sion of the affiliations set will alter the resulting communication network in diffe-
rent ways depending on the preferences themselves. Thus, the possibility for new 
social relationships depends crucially on the set of affiliations considered as good 
or bad for each individual.
The next two propositions focus on “Stars” one relevant type of hypergraphs 
(societies). More precisely, centralized societies i.e. societies characterized by the 
existence of one individual who shares at least one affiliation with everyone else 
so she is at the center of society. It must be noted that stars are networks characte-
rized by the fact that they have only one component.
Proposition 7 If H V E= ,( )  is a star, and  i i V i E i V( ) ( )∈ ( ) ∈=  an “upward 
monotonic” dichotomic preference profile with systems of thresholds given by 
T T Ti i i
k
= ,...,
1{ }  for each i V . Then, Γ H( )  is connected.
Proof. Let i V∗ ∈  be the star-center. Since, by definition, for all i V , E i( ) ≠  
then, there exist x x E’,   such that x  E Ei i( ) ∗( )∩
 and x’  E Ej i( ) ∗( )∩ .
 Hence, 
Social polarization and conflict: A network approach Ernesto Cárdenas   799
E Gi i
E
( ) ∗∈  and E Gi i
E
∗( ) ∈
 and E Gj i
E
( ) ∗∈  and E Gi j
E
∗( ) ∈ .
 Thus, ii H∗ ∈ ( )Γ  
and i j H∗ ∈ ( )Γ  i.e. there is a path from i  to j  and Γ H( )  is connected.    
Proposition 7 shows that under upward monotonic dichotomic preferences, the 
communication graph associated to a centralized society will always be connec-
ted. In other words, there is either direct or indirect communication between two 
individuals in society. Intuitively, if everyone communicates with the same per-
son (the star center), then it is always possible for any two people to communi-
cate through her.
Proposition 8 Under “ upward monotonic” preferences  i i V i E i V( ) ( )∈ ( ) ∈= , with 
systems of thresholds given by T T Ti i ik= ,...,1{ }  for each i V  if H V E= , ,( )
H V E’ ’= ,( )  are 2  stars such that # > #e H e Hh k ’   for all h k,  then ,  
Cl H Cl H’ (  (Γ Γ( )) ( ))≥ hence, Γ ΓH HP ’( ) ( ) .
Proof. Let i V∗ ∈  be the star-center. Since, by definition, for all i V , E i( ) ≠  
then, there exist x x E’,   such that x  E Ei i( ) ∗( )∩
 and x’  E Ej i( ) ∗∩ ( ) .
 
Hence, 
the degree of i  equals n1  for any star. Therefore, if # > #e E e Eh k
’   for all 
h k,  then, there exists at least 1  pair ij  such that ij e Eh   and ij e Ek ’∉ ∈ .  
Thus, there is at least one x  such that x E Ei j∈ ∩  and x E Ei
’
j
’∉ ∩ .  So, 
Cl H Cl H’ (  (Γ Γ( )) ( ))≥  hence Γ ΓH HP ’( ) ( )  because the clustering coefficient in 
Γ H( )  will be greater than that in Γ H’( )  and, therefore, according to clustering 
polarization (Axiom 5) Γ H( )  is less polarized than Γ H’( ).
Proposition 8 shows that under upward monotonic dichotomic preferences, if the 
cardinality of all hyperlinks is greater in one hypergraph than in another, then, 
the former will be less polarized. The intuition behind this result is that the more 
people share common affiliations, the more communication there will be among 
them and, therefore, society will be less polarized.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As explained above, polarization is highly correlated with social conflict. The 
model presented here may contribute to the analysis of social conflict in at least 
two respects. First, the explicit recognition of the fact that individuals have mul-
tiple affiliations overcomes the usual problem in economics of analyzing polari-
zation in terms of just one dimension. In fact, proposition 1 deals with the issue 
that most of the time people establish social relationships after finding a certain 
amount of commonalities with each other. Propositions 2 and 3 recognize the fact 
that, under upward monotonic preferences, people with longer sets of affiliations 
would have more opportunities to find things in common with others, thus, abating 
the sense of antagonism and, diminishing social polarization. As an example, con-
sider a Hutu in Kigali whose sense of identity is based on the only fact of being a 
Hutu. Thus, for him, it may be easier to consider a Tutsi as his enemy. But, recog-
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nizing the fact that he is not only a Hutu but also an habitant of Kigali, a citizen 
of Rwanda an African and a human being enables him to find some commonali-
ties with a Tutsi.
Second, the model also accounts for the fact that certain affiliations considered 
undesirable affiliations may block any social relationship. There is an old Italian 
tale about the rise of Fascism in the Twenties. A Fascist recruiter was trying to 
convince a socialist peasant to join the party. The peasant said: “I cannot join your 
party. My father was socialist and so was my grandfather so it is impossible for me 
to become a Fascist.” The recruiter responded: “Your reasoning is all wrong. What 
if your father and grandfather had both been assassins?” The peasant answered: 
“Ah, in that case, I would surely join the Fascist party.” Propositions 4 and 5 show 
that under downward monotonic preferences, if a person considers certain affilia-
tions as bad or undesirable and finds at least one of them in someone’s else affi-
liation set, then, there is no room for establishing communication, independently 
of the number of commonalities they may have and, as a consequence, polariza-
tion increases.
Proposition 6 shows that under a non-monotonic system of preferences, an expan-
sion of the affiliations set will alter the resulting communication network in diffe-
rent ways depending on the preferences themselves. Thus, the possibility of new 
social relationships depends crucially on the set of affiliations considered as good 
or bad by each individual.
Propositions 7 and 8 show that for centralized societies, the greater the number 
of people sharing each affiliation, the less the polarization. It remains for fur-
ther research to explore, among other questions, how changes in the affiliation 
sets modify the resulting communication graphs for different well known types of 
hypergraphs such as bipartite hypergraphs.
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